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Abstract
This paper presents and investigates a new data set of individual residential
property transactions in England. The main novelty of the data is the record of all
listing price changes and all offers made on a property, as well as all the visits by
potential buyers for a subset of the properties. We analyze individual seller and
potential buyers behavior within property transaction histories. This leads us to
establish a number of stylized facts pertaining specifically to the timing and terms
of agreement in housing transactions, and more generally, to the sequence of
events that occur from initial listing to sale agreement. We assess the limitations
of existing theories in explaining the data and propose an alternative theoretical
framework for the study of the strategic interactions between buyers and sellers
that is consistent with the empirical evidence.









School of Business - Dept of Real Estate





We thank Halifax Estate Agencies for giving us access to their transaction
records. We benefited from the comments of David Genesove, Hide Ichimura,
Steve Levitt, Peter Linneman, Chris Mayer, John Rust, Bill Wheaton, and seminar
and conference participants at several institutions. This project is funded by ESRC
grant number R000237737 and STICERD, LSE. The patient research assistance
of Christos Tsakonas, Fernando Goni, and Andrei Romanov was very much
appreciated.1 Introduction
The sale of a house is a typical example of a situation that entails strategic interactions
between a seller and a set of potential buyers. When a house is put on the market, the
seller posts a listing price and waits for potential buyers to make oﬀers. When a match
between the seller and a potential buyer occurs, bargaining takes place, leading possibly
to a sale agreement. At any point in time while a house is still on the market, the seller
has the option of revising the listing price.
This paper presents and investigates a new data set of individual residential property
transactions in England. The main, novel features of our data are the record of all listing
price changes and all oﬀers ever made on a property since initial listing. In addition,
we have a complete record of visits by potential buyers, called viewings, for a subset of
transactions in our sample. We are therefore in a unique position to analyze the behavior
of buyers and sellers within individual transaction histories and the extent to which the
sequence of events leading to a transaction aﬀect the sale price.
The picture of the house transaction process that emerges from the data can be
summarized as follows. The listing price inﬂuences the arrival of oﬀers, which ultimately
determines the timing of the sale. As time on the market increases, the arrival rate of
potential buyers decreases and the probability of a listing price revision increases. The
longer the time the property remains on the market, the lower the level of oﬀers relative
to the listing price, the higher the probability a match is successful, and the lower the
sale price relative to the listing price.
A relatively high initial listing price results in a higher sale price but also a longer
time on the market. Listing price reductions concern primarily properties which have
not received any oﬀer while being on the market for a substantial period of time (in fact,
a period equal to the average time to sale). Proportionally, decreases in listing price are
also substantial (in fact, greater than the average percentage diﬀerence between the sale
price and the initial listing price).
Almost 40 percent of sales occur at the ﬁrst oﬀer ever received. One third of the
potential buyers whose ﬁrst oﬀer is turned down walk away from the negotiation. The
remaining two thirds continue bargaining with the seller and are observed to make up to
four consecutive, increasing oﬀers before either they succeed in purchasing the property
or the negotiation terminates without an agreement.
1One third of all matches between the seller and a potential buyer are unsuccessful.
The vast majority of sellers whose ﬁrst match is unsuccessful end up selling at a higher
price, but a few end up accepting a lower oﬀer. The higher the number of matches in a
transaction history, the higher the sale price. These are just a few of the salient features
observed in the data.
To date, the lack of adequate data has limited the scope of empirical research on
housing transactions.1 Existing data sets typically include property characteristics, time
to sale, initial listing price, and sale price. They do not contain information on the buyer’s
side of the transaction (e.g., the timing and terms of oﬀers made by potential buyers), or
on the seller’s behavior between the listing and the sale of a property (e.g., the seller’s
decision to reject an oﬀer or to revise the listing price). This explains why most of the
empirical literature on housing transactions has either focused on the determinants of
the sale price or on the role of the listing price and its eﬀect on the time to sale.2
Recent attempts to overcome some of the data limitations by supplementing con-
ventional data sets with additional information have generated valuable insights. For
example, Genesove and Mayer (1997) build a data set for the Boston condominium
market where they are able to uncover the ﬁnancial position of each seller. They ﬁnd
that sellers with high loan-to-value ratio tend to set a higher initial listing price, have a
lower probability of sale but, if and when they sell, obtain a higher price. Glower et al.
(1998) conduct a phone survey to obtain information on each seller’s motivation (e.g.,
whether or not they have a planned moving date), for a real estate transaction data set
for Columbus, Ohio. The evidence suggests that sellers convey information about their
willingness to sell (i.e., their reservation value), through the listing price.3 Levitt and
Syverson (2002) identify instances where real estate agents sell their own property, in a
sample of transactions from suburban Cook county, Illinois. They ﬁnd evidence that the
informational advantage of agents induces distortions in the terms and timing of sales.
In addition to providing a valuable resource for empirical research on housing transac-
tions, our data raises new challenges for theoretical research on the strategic interactions
between buyers and sellers.4 We assess the limitations of existing theories in explaining
1This is also true for other markets where the transaction process involves search, matching and
bargaining, since the lack of data on rejected oﬀers is pervasive.
2See, e.g., Horowicz (1992) and Zuelke (1987).
3Similar evidence is reported, for example, in Anglin et al. (2001), Genesove and Mayer (2001),
Knight et al. (1998) and Springer (1996).
4For existing theoretical models of the behavior of buyers and sellers in the housing market see, e.g.,
Arnold (1999), Chen and Rosenthal (1996a) and (1996b), Coles (1998), Horowitz (1992), Yava¸ s (1992),
and Yava¸ s and Yang (1995).
2the data and propose an alternative framework that is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence. Our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for incomplete information
in the matching and bargaining environment where buyers and sellers interact in order to
explain the sequence of events in the housing transaction process as well as its outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data
set and provides institutional details of the residential real estate market in England.
Section 3 reports the results of our descriptive empirical analysis of the process leading
to the sale of a property, from its initial listing to a sale agreement. In Section 4, we
summarize our main ﬁndings, discuss the limitations of existing theories, present an
alternative theoretical framework, and assess its empirical implications.
2 Data
In England, most residential properties are marketed under sole agency agreement. This
means that a property is listed with a single real estate agency that coordinates all market
related activities concerning that property from the time it is listed until it either sells
or is withdrawn.
Agencies represent the seller only. Listing a property with an agency entails publishing
a sheet of property characteristics and a listing price.5 The listing price may be revised
at any time at the discretion of the seller. Potential buyers search by visiting local real
estate agents and viewing properties. A match between the seller and a potential buyer
occurs when the potential buyer makes an oﬀer. Within a match, the general practice
is for the seller to either accept or reject oﬀers. In the event the seller rejects an oﬀer,
the potential buyer either makes another oﬀer or walks away. If agreement occurs, both
parties engage the administrative procedure leading to the exchange of contracts and
the completion of the transaction. This procedure typically lasts three to eight weeks.
During this period, among other things, the buyer applies for mortgage and has the
property surveyed. Each party may cancel the sale agreement up to the exchange of
contracts.
For each property it represents, the agency keeps a ﬁle containing a detailed descrip-
tion of the property, its listing price, and a record of listing price changes, oﬀers, and
terms of the sale agreement, as required by law. The information contained in each
individual ﬁle is also recorded on the accounting register that is used by each agency
5Although not legally binding, the listing price is generally understood as a price the seller is com-
mitted to accept.
3to report to the head oﬃce. Although all visits of a property by potential buyers are
arranged by the listing agency, recording viewings is not required either by the head
oﬃce or by law. However, individual agencies may require their agents to collect this
information for internal management purposes.
Our data set was obtained from the records of four real estate agencies in England.6
Three of these agencies operate in the Greater London metropolitan area, one in South
Yorkshire. Our sample consists of 780 complete transaction histories of properties listed
and sold between June 1995 and April 1998 under sole agency agreement.7 Each observa-
tion contains the property’s characteristics as shown on the information sheet published
by the agency at the time of initial listing, the listing price and the date of the listing.
If any listing price change occurs, we observe its date and the new price. Each match is
described by the date of the ﬁrst oﬀer by a potential buyer and the sequence of buyer’s
oﬀers within the match. When a match is successful, we observe the sale agreed price
and the date of agreement which terminate the history. In addition, for the properties
listed with one of our Greater London agencies (which account for about a fourth of the
observations in our sample), we observe the complete history of viewings. Since events
are typically recorded by agents within the week of their occurrence, we use the week as
our unit of measure of time.
Our data spans two geographic areas with diﬀerent local economic conditions and two
diﬀerent phases of the cycle in the housing market. While the local economy in Greater
London has been experiencing a prolonged period of sustained growth, this has not been
the case in South Yorkshire. Furthermore, from June 1995 to April 1998, the housing
market in the Greater London metropolitan area went from a slow recovery to a boom.
While this transition occurred gradually, for ease of exposition we refer to 1995-96 as the
recovery and to 1997-98 as the boom.
Table 1 contains an overview of some of the features of our data. Column 1 refers
to the properties in our sample located in South Yorkshire. Columns 2 and 3 refer to
properties located in Greater London that were listed during the recovery and the boom,
respectively. Column 4 refers to the overall sample. Several observations are noteworthy.
First, more active housing markets (e.g., Greater London vs. South Yorkshire) appear to
be characterized by higher sale price relative to listing price, fewer listing price changes,
more oﬀers, and more matches. Most of these observations hold true when we compare
6These agencies are all part of Halifax Estate Agencies Limited, one of the largest network of real
estate agents in England.
7Each entry in our data was validated by checking the consistency of the records in the accounting
register and in the individual ﬁles. Observations with inconsistent or incomplete records were dropped.
4booming markets to dull markets (e.g., Greater London in 1997-98 vs. 1995-96). Overall,
properties in our sample, on average, sell at about 96% of their listing price after being
on the market for 11 weeks. More than three quarters of all properties sell without any
revision of their listing price. The average number of matches and the average number
of oﬀers indicate that most properties are sold to the ﬁrst potential buyer who makes an
oﬀer on the property, but not necessarily at their ﬁrst oﬀer. In addition to the information
reported in Table 1, note that for the sub-sample of 199 properties for which viewings
records are available, the average number of viewings per property is equal to 9.5 and
the average number of viewings per week on the market is equal to 1.7.
Table 1: Overview
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Number of observations 343 239 198 780
Average initial listing price £40,665 £86,783 £99,820 £69,812
% transactions with a price change 35.28 17.99 8.59 23.21
Average number of matches 1.26 1.62 1.53 1.44
Average number of oﬀers 1.73 2.91 2.38 2.26
Average sale price £37,989 £83,524 £97,168 £66,964
Sale price/listing price (%) 93.4% 96.2% 97.3% 95.9%
Average weeks to sale 15 10 7 11
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of the properties in
our sample.8 The variables FLAT, TERR, SEMI, and DET are dummy variables for the
type of property. They denote ﬂats, terraced, semi-detached, and detached properties,
respectively. The variables B1, B2, B3, and B4 are dummy variables which stand for one,
two, three, and four or more bedrooms, respectively. GARAGE indicates whether the
property has a garage. TOTA is the total area measured in square meters, NBATH is the
number of bathrooms, and APPL is the number of appliances listed on the characteristic
sheet published by the agent.9 As we can see from column 7, most properties in our
sample have either two or three bedrooms (77 percent). Semi-detached properties are
the most represented (38 percent). Terraced properties, detached houses, and ﬂats,
account for 27, 15, and 20 percent of the sample, respectively. The remainder of the
table illustrates the type of housing sold in each of the local markets we consider.
8These characteristics are only a subset of the ones listed in the information sheet published by the
agency at the time of initial listing. The additional variables were excluded from our analysis since they
appear to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on prices.
9Agents typically list the major appliances to be left with the property. The number of such appliances
was the only information recorded in the data set.
5Table 2: Property characteristics
Yorkshire London London Overall
97-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Variable Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev
FLAT 0.026 0.16 0.264 0.442 0.439 0.498 0.204 0.403
TERR 0.318 0.466 0.222 0.416 0.263 0.441 0.274 0.446
SEMI 0.464 0.499 0.389 0.489 0.202 0.403 0.375 0.484
DET 0.192 0.395 0.125 0.332 0.096 0.295 0.147 0.355
TOTA 66.1 17.5 59 22.1 53.93 18.07 60.8 19.8
NBATH 1.24 0.576 1.42 0.615 1.29 0.519 1.31 0.579
GARAGE 0.426 0.495 0.377 0.486 0.263 0.441 0.369 0.483
APPL 0.793 1.19 1.25 1.5 0.949 1.17 0.973 1.306
B1 0.006 0.076 0.184 0.388 0.263 0.441 0.126 0.332
B2 0.306 0.462 0.31 0.463 0.323 0.469 0.312 0.463
B3 0.592 0.492 0.364 0.482 0.353 0.479 0.461 0.499
B4 0.096 0.295 0.142 0.35 0.061 0.239 0.101 0.302
Before turning our attention to the analysis of the data, a few remarks are in order.
First, our data refers to complete transaction histories only, from initial listing to sale
agreement. In particular, properties that are listed and then withdrawn from the market
before a sale agreement are not in our sample. For this reason, the emphasis of the paper
is on the events leading to the sale of a property and on the behavior of buyers and sellers
during this process.10
Second, while none of the properties in the data set were sold at a formal auction, it
is nevertheless possible that two or more buyers found themselves bidding on the same
property at the same time. Sifting through the records of transaction histories, we detect
the occurrence of about 30 de facto auctions out of 780 transactions. The properties
concerned sold at a higher than average price relative to eﬀective listing price. In fact,
such de facto auctions account for all instances in the data where the sale price is above
the listing price (except for small diﬀerences due to rounding up). All the qualitative
and quantitative ﬁndings of our analysis are robust to the exclusion of these transaction
histories from the data set.
Third, the cancellation of a sale agreement is not a rare phenomenon. In our sample,
1 out of 5 agreements is cancelled. Agents’ records indicate that cancellations are usually
due to the arrival of new information such as a bad inspection outcome or failure to obtain
mortgage. A sale agreement may also be contingent upon the successful completion of
10Withdrawals are not infrequent. Based on a preliminary investigation we estimate that as many as
25 percent of all listings may end up being withdrawn prior to a sale.
6other transactions (e.g., the purchase of a house by the seller). Hence, cancellations may
also be induced by the failure of related transactions. Here we implicitly assume that
parties bargain in earnest. That is, we assume that the right to cancel a sale agreement
does not distort the behavior of the parties involved in a housing transaction and that
the object of a negotiation is the sale of a house.
3 Descriptive Empirical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the details of the process leading to the sale of a property, from
its initial listing to a sale agreement. The ﬁrst step in this process is the setting of the
listing price on the part of the seller. In section 3.1, we analyze the choice of the initial
listing price and whether, when, and to what extent sellers revise their decision. The
next step is the occurrence of matches between the seller and the potential buyers who
choose to make oﬀers on a property. We describe the occurrence of matches in section
3.2 and the sequence of oﬀers within and across matches in section 3.3. The ﬁnal step of
the transaction process is the sale of a property. In section 3.4, we analyze the timing
and terms of the sale agreement. Restricting attention to the sub-sample of properties
for which information on viewings is available, we analyze the role played by viewings in
the process leading to the sale of a property in section 3.5.
To investigate the eﬀects of local market conditions on transaction histories, through-
out our analysis we use agency-speciﬁc dummy variables, labelled AGENCY1, AGENCY2,
AGENCY3, and AGENCY4, where AGENCYi is equal to 1 if the property is located
in the local market where agency i operates and 0 otherwise (i = 1,2,3,4). Note that
agencies 1, 2, and 3 list properties located in diﬀerent communities within the Greater
London metropolitan area, while agency 4 operates in South Yorkshire. To account for
aggregate dynamics in the English housing market we specify a linear trend for the month
in our sampling period when each property was listed, MONTH, and an additional linear
trend for the properties located in Greater London, MONTHGL.
3.1 Listing Price
We begin our analysis by investigating the relation between the initial listing price of a
property and its observable characteristics using the standard hedonic framework. The
results of a regression of the initial listing price (ILISTP) on the property characteristics,
agency dummies, and the trend variables MONTH and MONTHGL are reported in Table
73.11 Note that the default property is a one bedroom semi-detached house located in
South Yorkshire (i.e., the local market where agency 4 operates).
Table 3: Initial listing price


















All of the parameter estimates associated with the property characteristics included
in the hedonic regression are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels and have the
expected sign and reasonable magnitudes.12 The variables included in our regression
jointly account for 80 percent of the observed variability in the initial listing price. This
level of explanatory power is comparable to what is typically found in the literature on
hedonic models of housing prices.13 Overall, initial listing prices depend to a large extent
on the observable characteristics of the properties. The hedonic model, however, cannot
fully account for the variability in initial listing prices. The estimated coeﬃcients of
the agency dummies and the time trend for Greater London indicate that, after control-
ling for property characteristics, more active housing markets and booming markets are
associated with higher listing prices.
11In this table as for all other estimations below, we only report whether each parameter estimate is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level. We indicate this occurrence with the superscript ∗.
12Given the size of its estimated coeﬃcient, the variable APPL must be capturing more than the
monetary value of what it accounts for.
13Recent work which incorporates variables accounting for the details of all local public amenities
generates higher values for the regression’s R2 (e.g., Cheshire and Sheppard 2000). These details are
not available in our data.
8The ﬁrst novelty of our data set is the information on listing price changes. This
information is summarized in Table 4. About one fourth of all sellers change their listing
price at least once.14 Before a ﬁrst price change, they wait 11 weeks on average. Recall
from Table 1 above that the average time to sale is also 11 weeks. This observation
suggests that sellers who change their listing price wait a signiﬁcant amount of time
before doing it. In more active markets price changes are less frequent.
Table 4: Listing price changes
Yorshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Price change distribution:
% properties with 0 65 82 91 77
% properties with 1 26 14 8 18
% properties with 2+ 9 4 1 5
First price change:
Average % price decrease 6.3 3.4 2.6 5.3
Average weeks since listing 12 10 9 11
% properties with no oﬀer yet 92 71 80 86
Second price change:
Average % price decrease 4.8 2.6 - 4.4
Average weeks since ﬁrst price change 9 7 - 8
% properties with no oﬀer yet 72 67 - 70
In the vast majority of cases, sellers who decrease their listing price have no prior
response from prospective buyers: in 86 percent of the cases, price changes occur before an
oﬀer was ever received. To explore whether this ﬁnding is indicative of a robust relation
between the lack of oﬀers and the probability of a listing price reduction, we estimate a
ﬂexible functional form hazard (Flinn and Heckman 1982) for the probability of a ﬁrst
listing price revision in any given week since initial listing.15 The ﬂexible functional form
for the hazard function we consider here is given by:
P(ELISTPt 6= ILISTP|ELISTPt−1 = ILISTP) = e
β0+β1t+β2t2+β3t3+β4X1,t+β5X2, (1)
where t denotes weeks since initial listing, ILISTP the initial listing price, ELISTPt the
eﬀective listing price at time t, X1,t the vector of time-varying covariates and X2 the vector
of time-invariant covariates.16 The set of time-invariant variables we consider includes
14Only 9 transactions involved 3 listing price changes, the maximum observed in our sample.
15This approach consists of approximating the baseline hazard function with a polynomial function
in time, where the order of the polynomial function is chosen to best ﬁt the data.
16Since not all sellers revise their listing price, some observations are censored. We correct for censoring
in the estimation which is carried out by maximum likelihood.
9property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, and the initial listing
price. Our speciﬁcation also includes a time-varying variable denoting the highest oﬀer
received each week as a proportion of the eﬀective listing price (HOELISTP). HOELISTP
is set to zero when no oﬀer is received and thus captures both whether or not an oﬀer is
received and the relative level of the oﬀer.
Table 5: Time to ﬁrst price change














MONTH × 10−2 3.758∗ 1.010
MONTHGL × 10−2 −4.407∗ 1.972
ILISTP × 10−5 −1.262∗ 0.539
HOELISTP −0.772∗ 0.343
T × 10−1 3.154∗ 0.462
T2 × 10−2 −1.415∗ 0.235
T3 × 10−4 1.532∗ 0.274
INTERCEPT −5.047∗ 0.527
As reported in Table 5, all terms of the cubic speciﬁcation of the baseline hazard
are signiﬁcant displaying the following non-monotonic pattern: the probability of a price
revision increases ﬁrst up to 15 weeks, it then decreases until week 47 before rising again.17
Receiving a high oﬀer decreases the probability of a price change. A high initial listing
price also decreases the probability of a listing price change. Price changes are more likely
in the later part of our sampling period as indicated by the positive coeﬃcient associated
with the variable MONTH. However, the probability of a price change decreases in a
booming market, as indicated by the negative sign of the coeﬃcient associated with
MONTHGL and by the fact that this eﬀect dominates the positive eﬀect of MONTH.
17Likelihood ratio tests reject higher-order polynomial speciﬁcations in favor of the cubic speciﬁcation
reported here.
10Table 6: Size of ﬁrst listing price change





















Virtually all price changes are price decreases.18 As shown in Table 4, the drop in price
is typically substantial.19 It is equal to 5.3 percent on average, which is greater than the
average sale price discount relative to initial listing price (4.1 percent). In more active
markets listing price reductions are smaller on average. To investigate which factors
are systematically related to the size of listing price reductions, we run a regression of
the ﬁrst listing price revision (as a percentage of the initial listing price) on property
characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, initial listing price, number of
weeks between listing and price change (WTFPC), and a dummy variable equal to one
if no oﬀers were made on the property (NOOFF). The results are reported in Table
6.20 The longer the time on the market before the change, the larger the drop. Also,
the higher the initial listing price, the smaller the listing price revision in percentage
terms. The lack of oﬀers does not seem to have any eﬀect on the magnitude of listing
18Of the three cases of listing price increases, one is minor, less than one percent. The other two are
more substantial: one is an adjustment within a few days of initial listing, the other occurs three months
after initial listing.
19Using data from Stockton, California, Knight (2002) also ﬁnds that when sellers change their listing
price, the listing price at the time of sale is substantially below the initial listing price.
20The number of ﬁrst listing price changes in our data is 181.
11price changes. Also note that, holding everything else constant, the eﬀect of market
conditions disappears.
3.2 Matches
The second novelty of our data set concerns the record of all matches that occur between
each seller in our sample and the potential buyers who choose to make oﬀers on her
property. This information is summarized in Table 7. Approximately 72 percent of all
transactions occur within the ﬁrst match. Only 10 percent of all sales occur after 3 or
more matches.21 About a third of all matches are not successful. On average, the success
rate of ﬁrst matches is higher than that of later matches. About three quarters of the
sellers are matched with a potential buyer within ten weeks of putting their property on
the market. More than ten percent within one week. Looking at diﬀerences across local
markets, columns 1-3 in Table 7 illustrate that more active markets and booming markets
are characterized by greater turnover: matches occur sooner, they are more frequent, and
their success rate is lower.
Table 7: Matches
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Matches per sale:
Average 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.4
% properties with 1 79 64 68.1 71.7
% properties with 2 17.2 20.9 17.7 18.4
% properties with 3 2.6 8 9.1 5.9
% properties with 4+ 1.2 7.1 5.1 3.9
Time to ﬁrst match (weeks)
Average 12 7 5 9
Median 8 5 3 5
% with match within 1 week 3.5 16.3 16.7 12.6
% with match within 10 weeks 61.2 80.3 87.4 73.7
Success rate:
All matches 79.4 61.6 65.6 69.5
First match 81.6 66.5 72.2 74.6
Second match 70.8 58.1 54.0 61.1
Third match 69.2 47.2 50.0 51.9
21Only 10 transactions occur after 5 or more matches and the maximum number of matches in the
sample is 7.
12Figure 1 plots the average number of matches per week for all properties still on
the market. This measure of the rate of arrival of matches increases from the ﬁrst to
the second week. Following this rise, the rate of arrival gradually decreases up to 21
weeks, before rising again. To explore further the dynamics of the rate of arrival of
matches, we estimate a ﬂexible functional form hazard (similar to the one above) for
the probability the ﬁrst match occurs in any given week since initial listing. The set of
time-invariant variables we consider includes property characteristics, agency dummies,
MONTH, and MONTHGL. Our speciﬁcation also includes two time-varying variables
denoting the eﬀective listing price and the occurrence of listing price changes (DPC),
respectively.22
Table 8: Time to ﬁrst match














MONTH × 10−2 3.025∗ 0.615
MONTHGL × 10−2 0.197 0.872
ELISTP × 10−6 −1.417 2.097
DPC 0.243∗ 0.104
T × 10−2 −2.258∗ 1.065
T2 × 10−4 4.990∗ 2.343
INTERCEPT −3.392∗ 0.243
The maximum likelihood estimates and standard errors we obtain are reported in
Table 8. All terms of the quadratic speciﬁcation of the baseline hazard are signiﬁcant
displaying the following non-monotonic pattern: the probability of arrival of the ﬁrst
match decreases for the ﬁrst 23 weeks since initial listing and then increases.23 Holding
22DPC is a time-varying indicator variable that takes the value 0 prior to a listing price change and
1 from the occurrence of a listing price change on.
23Likelihood ratio tests reject higher-order polynomial speciﬁcations in favor of the quadratic speciﬁ-
cation reported here.
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Weekeverything else constant, the probability of arrival of the ﬁrst match increases with a
listing price revision, but does not vary with the current level of the listing price. Also,
more active markets are associated with a higher probability of arrival of the ﬁrst match.
3.3 Oﬀers
When a match occurs, the seller and the potential buyer engage in a bilateral bargaining
process characterized by a sequence of buyer’s oﬀers that the seller either accepts or
rejects. The third novelty of our data set is that it contains detailed information on all
oﬀers ever made on a property. This information is summarized in Tables 9, 10, and 11.
Table 9: Oﬀers
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Number of matches 432 388 302 1122
Distribution of oﬀers per match:
Average 1.37 1.79 1.56 1.57
% matches with 1 69.9 44.6 56.0 57.4
% matches with 2 23.4 34.5 33.1 29.9
% matches with 3 6.5 18.0 9.6 11.3
% matches with 4 0.2 2.8 1.3 1.4
First oﬀer relative to listing price 92.4 94.3 95.6 94.0
Increments within match:
First to second oﬀer 5.22 2.64 2.33 3.26
Second to third oﬀer 3.19 1.98 1.50 2.12
Percentage separations
After one unsuccessful oﬀer 36.6 28.3 31.1 31.5
After two unsuccessful oﬀers 31.0 34.1 50.0 38.1
After three unsuccessful oﬀers 50.0 65.6 71.4 66.7
Table 9 reports the main features of observed sequences of oﬀers within matches.
Potential buyers make up to four consecutive oﬀers. On average, successive oﬀers within
a sequence increase at a decreasing rate. In more than half of the matches only one
oﬀer is exchanged. Almost 40 percent of sales occur at the ﬁrst oﬀer ever received, 54
percent occur at the ﬁrst oﬀer of a match. Upon rejection of their ﬁrst oﬀer, 68 percent
of all potential buyers make a second oﬀer. The remaining 32 percent walk away, hence
terminating the negotiation. The incidence of separations increases with the number of
rejected oﬀers. That is, the fraction of potential buyers who terminate a negotiation
14after having their ﬁrst oﬀer rejected is smaller than the fraction of potential buyers who
do so after a second or third rejection.
In Table 10, we restrict attention to oﬀer sequences within a match that are not
censored by agreement with the seller (i.e., matches that terminate with a separation).
The higher the number of oﬀers in a match the lower the ﬁrst oﬀer relative to the listing
price. In general, the higher the number of oﬀers in a match, the higher the last oﬀer
relative to the eﬀective listing price. It therefore appears that the more oﬀers there are
in a match, the broader the interval spanned by the oﬀers. As we can see from columns
1-3 in Tables 9 and 10, in more active markets we observe a larger number of oﬀers and
oﬀers that are on average closer to the listing price. Within oﬀer sequences, however, we
observe smaller increments.
Table 10: Spread of oﬀers, unsuccessful matches
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
2 oﬀers in match
First oﬀer relative to listing price 85.0 93.5 93.2 92.1
Last oﬀer relative to listing price 88.6 96.6 95.9 95.2
3 oﬀers in match
First oﬀer relative to listing price - 90.9 92.3 91.1
Last oﬀer relative to listing price - 95.6 95.9 96.1
In Table 11, we compare the ﬁrst oﬀer in a match across diﬀerent matches within a
transaction history. On average, the ﬁrst oﬀer relative to the listing price is increasing in
the number of matches in a transaction history. In particular, both in the aggregate as
well as in each local market, the ﬁrst oﬀer in the ﬁrst match is on average farther away
from the listing price than the ﬁrst oﬀer in successive matches. To investigate which
factors are systematically related to the level of the ﬁrst oﬀer in a match, we regress
the ﬁrst oﬀer in a match as a percentage of the eﬀective listing price at the time of
the match (PERMFOEL) on the property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH,
MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial listing and the occurrence of the match
(WTMATCH), and a dummy variable equal to one if it is the ﬁrst match and zero
otherwise (MATCH1). The results are contained in Table 12.24
Ceteris paribus, the level of the ﬁrst oﬀer in a match relative to the listing price is
lower the longer a property has been on the market and if it is the ﬁrst oﬀer ever made
24We report robust standard errors which account for the fact that observations are independent across
properties but not across matches within the same transaction history.
15Table 11: First oﬀer relative to listing price
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
First match 92.2 93.9 95.3 93.5
Second match 93.2 94.7 96.6 94.7
Third match 92.2 95.5 97.3 95.6
Fourth match 93.4 97.1 97.2 96.6
on a property. Also, after controlling for property characteristics, time on the market,
and order of matches, the level of the ﬁrst oﬀer in a match is closer to the eﬀective listing
price in more active housing markets.
Table 12: First oﬀer relative to eﬀective listing price





















The timing and terms of the sale agreement for the properties in our sample are summa-
rized in Table 13. In the table, the eﬀective listing price denotes the listing price at the
time of the sale agreement. Overall, properties in our sample sell at about 96% of their
eﬀective listing price and 13 percent of the properties sell at the listing price. The mean
16and median time to sale are 11 and 7 weeks, respectively. In a booming housing market
sale prices are on average closer to the eﬀective listing prices, a larger fraction of sales
occur at the listing price, and properties sell considerably faster.
Table 13: Sale price and time to sale
Yorshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Sale price vs eﬀective listing price:
Average as percent of listing price 95.0 96.8 97.6 96.2
% with prices equal 13.4 8.4 26.8 15.3
% with sale price greater 5.0 2.5 4.6 4.1
Time to sale
Average 15 10 7 11
Median 10 7 5 7
Within 2 weeks 3.2 18.0 23.2 12.82
Within 20 weeks 75.8 89.1 93.94 84.49
Maximum 69 69 42 69
To investigate which factors systematically aﬀect the timing of a sale agreement, we
estimate a ﬂexible functional form hazard for the probability a sale would occur in any
given week since initial listing. The set of time-invariant variables we consider includes
property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, and MONTHGL. Our speciﬁcation
also includes three time-varying variables denoting the eﬀective listing price in each week,
the number of oﬀers received each week, and the highest oﬀer received each week as a
proportion of the eﬀective listing price, HOELISTP.25 Maximum likelihood estimates and
standard errors are reported in Table 14.
The only estimated parameter that is signiﬁcant is the one associated with the variable
HOELISTP. Conditional on at least one oﬀer being made on a property in any given week,
the larger the best oﬀer relative to the listing price, the higher the probability of a sale
agreement. In particular, none of the terms in our quadratic speciﬁcation in time is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.26 This implies that the baseline hazard is constant. In
other words, after conditioning on the arrival and the size of oﬀers, the probability of a
sale occurring in any given week is constant over time. These ﬁndings point to the rather
obvious conclusion that the main determinant of whether a property sells in a given week
is whether or not an oﬀer is made and how high this oﬀer is relative to the listing price.
25Recall that this variable is equal to zero if no oﬀer is received in a week.
26The same result holds for any polynomial speciﬁcation.
17Table 14: Time to sale
















ELISTP × 10−6 0.450 4.777
NOFFERS × 10−2 0.832 4.419
HOELISTP 6.607∗ 0.753
T × 10−3 3.825 23.703
T2 × 10−5 −0.352 56.096
INTERCEPT −6.217∗ 0.834
Figure 2 plots the sale price of each property relative to its eﬀective listing price as
a function of the number of weeks since initial listing.27 A few relatively inexpensive
properties (listed for less than £20,000) sell at a very large discount, up to 50 percent. In
the vast majority of cases the sale price is below the listing price. A few transactions take
place at a sale price above the listing price. These instances are due either to rounding
up or to simultaneous bidding by competing buyers.28
Figure 2 suggests that the longer a property is on the market, the lower its sale price
relative to its listing price. To explore whether this relation is robust, we regress the
the sale price as a percentage of the listing price on the property characteristics, agency
dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the initial listing price, and the number of weeks from
initial listing to sale agreement (WTSALE). The results are contained in Table 15. The
shorter the time on the market, the higher the sale price as a percentage of the listing
27About 11 percent of all properties took more than 26 weeks to sell and are omitted from the graph.
28The “luckiest” seller at this game had a listing price of £99,950. He turned down an oﬀer at £85,000
two weeks after initial listing. A few days later, 4 buyers started bidding against each others, pushing
the price up to £125,000.






































eprice. An active housing market and a booming market are also associated with higher
sale prices relative to listing prices.
Table 15: Sale price as a percentage of listing price



















In Table 16, we summarize information relative to sale agreements that follow an
unsuccessful ﬁrst match. In 13 percent of the cases properties sell at a price below the
maximum oﬀer in the ﬁrst match, 20 percent sell for the same amount, and the remaining
two thirds of the properties sell at a price above (see also Figure 3). On average, after
an unsuccessful ﬁrst match, sellers wait 6 weeks before reaching a sale agreement and
realize a 4 percent gain relative to the best oﬀer in the ﬁrst match.29
Table 16: When ﬁrst match unsuccessful
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Additional weeks to sale 8 6 3 6
Gain as percent of max oﬀer ﬁrst match 5.1 3.2 3.8 4.0
Percent sales below max oﬀer ﬁrst match 13.9 19.8 3.2 13.1
Percent sales at max oﬀer of ﬁrst match 20.8 14.1 23.8 19.5
29This gain is large relative to the gain to the real estate agent who earns less than 2 percent of the
incremental proﬁt. This observation is consistent with the argument in Levitt and Syverson (2002).
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For a sub-sample of 199 properties located in the local market within the Greater London
metropolitan area where one of our agencies operates, our data set contains complete
viewing records. A viewing is recorded each time a potential buyer visits a property.
Information on viewings is summarized in Table 17. On average, there are 9.5 viewings
per transaction. Only 9 properties sell after one viewing. The median number of viewings














As illustrated in Figure 4, the arrival rate of viewings over time displays a monotonic
decreasing pattern that is similar to the one observed for the arrival rate of matches. The
viewing rate gradually decreases with time on the market. The data does not display a
discrete drop in the arrival rate of viewings after a week or two. Hence, there does not
seem to be a stock of potential buyers waiting for new properties to be listed and going
to view them upon listing. If there is, this stock is minimal relative to the regular ﬂow
of new potential buyers arriving on the local market in any given week.
To investigate whether there is a systematic relation between the rate of arrival of
viewings and the listing price, we run a Poisson regression of the number of viewings
per week, on the initial listing price, property characteristics, and MONTHGL.30 The
results are reported in Table 18. Holding everything else constant, a higher listing price
is associated with a lower rate of arrival of viewings.31
30The estimation procedure controls for the fact that properties diﬀer in their exposure time (i.e.,
weeks on the market).
31This result also obtains if instead of a Poisson model we consider more ﬂexible functional forms for
the stochastic process of the arrival of viewings.
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WeekTable 18: Number of viewings












ILISTP × 10−5 −0.395∗ 0.154
INTERCEPT −0.498∗ 0.122
Pseudo R2 .17
Using the additional information on viewings we revisit some of the issues we ad-
dressed earlier and investigate the role played by viewings in the process leading to the
sale of a property. In particular, we investigate the relation of viewings with listing price
revisions, the arrival of matches, and the timing of sale agreements. For each week a
property is on the market, we deﬁne two variables that measure the number of viewings
in the week and the cumulative number of viewings from initial listing. We include these
two additional explanatory variables in our econometric analysis of the time to ﬁrst price
change, the time to ﬁrst match, and the time to sale. The results of these exercises can
be summarized as follows. On the one hand, we ﬁnd no relation between the occurrence
(or the lack) of viewings and either the probability of observing a price change or the
probability of a sale agreement. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the more viewings in
a week and the greater the total number of viewings since initial listing, the higher the
probability of receiving an oﬀer that week.32
Overall, the results in this section indicate that, holding everything else constant,
a lower listing price increases the arrival rate of viewings, which in turn increases the
arrival rate of oﬀers. Thus, the listing price aﬀects the arrival of oﬀers indirectly, by
aﬀecting the arrival of viewings.
32The maximum likelihood estimates of ﬂexible functional form hazards for these probabilities which
include the additional variables on viewings are not reported here to economize on space.
214 Discussion
In the previous section, we investigated a number of issues pertaining to the details of the
process leading to the sale of a property, from its initial listing to a sale agreement. This
process can be thought of as a combination of a dynamic optimization problem faced by
the seller and a sequence of bargaining problems between the seller and each potential
buyer who initiates a match by making an oﬀer on the property. In this section, for each
of these two aspects of the transaction process we summarize our key ﬁndings, compare
them with the predictions of the existing theories, and discuss an alternative framework
that is consistent with the empirical evidence.
4.1 Listing Price
The solution of the dynamic optimization problem faced by the seller yields an initial
listing price and an intertemporal decision rule specifying whether, when, and to what
extent she should revise the listing price as time goes by. The evidence shows that a
sizeable fraction of sellers revise their listing price at least once. Those who do typically
reduce it by a substantial amount after waiting a substantial period of time without
receiving any oﬀer. These ﬁndings are in stark contrast to the predictions of existing
theories of sellers’ behavior in the housing market.
With respect to the choice of the optimal listing price, it is typically assumed that
the seller faces a trade-oﬀ between the rate of arrival of buyers and the sale price: a
low listing price increases the arrival rate of buyers but precludes the possibility of sales
at a high price (e.g., Haurin 1988). This assumption is consistent with our empirical
evidence. Existing theoretical models, however, imply that in equilibrium, either the
seller never revises the listing price (e.g., Arnold 1999, Chen and Rosenthal 1996a and
1996b, Horowitz 1992 and Yava¸ s and Yang, 1995), or she gradually lowers the listing
price over time in a continuous fashion (e.g., Coles 1998).
We propose a simple extension that overcomes this shortcoming of existing theories.
Suppose that potential buyers restrict their search to properties whose listing price is
below a certain amount. Depending on their characteristics (e.g., income and prefer-
ences), diﬀerent potential buyers will have diﬀerent upper bounds on the listing price
of the properties they are willing to consider.33 As long as the distribution of these
bounds in the population of potential buyers exhibits heaping at certain amounts, this
33Also, diﬀerent potential buyers may search diﬀerent types of properties.
22buyers’ search behavior will induce heaping of the distribution of listing prices at the
same amounts.
To illustrate why this is true, consider ﬁrst the case where the distribution of upper
bounds characterizing the search behavior of potential buyers, F(·), is discrete and takes
a ﬁnite number of values. When choosing her optimal listing price, a seller faces a
fundamental trade-oﬀ between the rate of arrival of potential buyers and the level of the
maximum potential oﬀer. The higher the listing price, the lower the rate of arrival of
potential buyers, but the higher the maximum potential oﬀer. Suppose a seller does not
list her property at a price that corresponds to one of the mass points of the distribution
F. The marginal cost (in terms of a decrease of the arrival rate of potential buyers) of
raising her listing price up to the nearest mass point is zero. On the other hand, the
marginal beneﬁt is positive since raising the listing price increases the maximum potential
oﬀer. Hence, no seller will list her property at prices that do not correspond to mass
points of the distribution F. By continuity, a similar argument holds if the distribution
F is continuous but exhibits heaping, in which case the distribution of listing prices will
also exhibit heaping.
Consider next an environment where some sellers face a time constraint (e.g., a dead-
line). Then, given our assumption about the search behavior of potential buyers, the
optimal listing price strategy of these sellers might entail lowering their listing price in a
discrete fashion as time goes by. As described above, the choice of a listing price restricts
the set of potential buyers by “excluding” those buyers whose upper bound is below the
listing price. At any given time, the cost of choosing a given listing price instead of
a lower one is a lower instantaneous rate of arrival of potential buyers, which implies
a higher probability of remaining on the market. As time goes by (and the deadline
approaches), the seller’s continuation value of remaining on the market decreases, and
hence the cost of missing potential sale opportunities increases. On the other hand, the
beneﬁt from a higher maximum potential oﬀer remains constant. Therefore, it may be
optimal for a seller to drop her listing price over time. Our previous result on the heaping
of the distribution of listing prices implies that if a drop occurs it will be discrete. These
implications of our analysis are consistent with the observations.
The distinguishing feature of the theoretical framework described above is the “seg-
mentation” of the market, where the bounds of the segments are deﬁned by the modes of
the distribution of upper bounds characterizing the search behavior of potential buyers.
This raises the question of whether our segmented-market hypothesis is supported by
the data.
23The ﬁrst implication of our assumption about the search behavior of potential buyers
is that the distribution of listing prices should exhibit heaping. Figure 5 displays the
histogram of initial listing prices for the properties in our sample.34. As we can see from
Figure 5, a large fraction of listing prices are bunched around the bounds of £5,000
segments (e.g., ..., £65,000, £70,000, £75,000, ...). In particular, about half of all
initial listing prices in the sample are within £50 of these bounds. The same pattern
emerges when we partition the sample into local markets for each particular type of
property.
The second implication of the segmented-market hypothesis is that price changes that
reposition a property from a market segment to a lower one should signiﬁcantly increase
the arrival rate of oﬀers. On the other hand, price changes that leave a property in the
same segment should have a negligible eﬀect. To address these issues we estimate the
probability of receiving the ﬁrst oﬀer in any given week since initial listing using a hazard
speciﬁcation similar to the one reported above (see Table 8), but where we replace the
listing price change indicator variable DPC with two dummy variables indicating whether
the change leaves the property in the same £5,000 segment (SAMESEG), or places it in a
lower £5,000 segment (LOWERSEG), respectively.35 The maximum likelihood estimates
and standard errors are reported in Table 19. Holding everything else constant, a listing
price revision that reallocates a property from a £5,000 segment to a lower one increases
the probability of arrival of the ﬁrst oﬀer, while a change in the listing price that leaves
the property in the same £5,000 segment has no eﬀect on this probability.36 Overall, our
ﬁndings provide empirical support for the segmented-market hypothesis.
4.2 Matching, Bargaining and Sale Agreement
We now turn our attention to the matching and bargaining aspects of the process leading
to the sale of a property. The terms of a sale agreement are the outcome of a negotiation
between the seller and the (ultimate) buyer of the property. The evidence shows that
the majority of sales does not occur at the ﬁrst oﬀer. Buyers whose ﬁrst oﬀer is turned
down either increase their oﬀer or walk away. A substantial fraction of matches are
34To make the graph more readable we excluded the 7 properties in our sample that are listed above
£180,000
35SAMESEG and LOWERSEG are two time-varying indicator variables that take the value 0 prior to
a listing price change and 1 from the occurrence of a listing price change on, depending of course on the
nature of the price change. Note that in half of the cases, the revised listing price is in a lower segment.
36These results are robust to the inclusion of the actual size of the price reduction in the econometric
speciﬁcation—the coeﬃcient of this additional variable is not signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcients of the other
variables remain virtually unchanged. They also obtain in Poisson regressions of the overall rate of
arrival of oﬀers and of the rate of arrival of viewings.









































































































yTable 19: Time to ﬁrst oﬀer revisited














MONTH × 10−2 3.056∗ 0.616
MONTHGL × 10−2 0.218 0.866
ELISTP × 10−6 −1.370 2.091
SAMESEG 0.200 0.130
LOWERSEG 0.341∗ 0.139
T × 10−2 −2.309∗ 1.068
T2 × 10−4 5.089∗ 2.342
INTERCEPT −3.380∗ 0.243
unsuccessful. The vast majority of sellers who fail to reach an agreement within their
ﬁrst match end up selling at a higher price. However, a signiﬁcant fraction end up
eventually accepting a lower oﬀer. These ﬁndings directly contradict the predictions of
existing matching and bargaining theories of housing transactions.
With respect to the bargaining process between the seller and each potential buyer,
it is typically assumed that when a negotiation begins, the value of the surplus to be
divided (that is, the diﬀerence between the buyer’s willingness to pay for the house and
the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell the house) is known to both parties
(e.g., Nash 1950, Rubinstein 1982). Based on this assumption, existing theoretical models
of housing transactions imply that agreement is reached on the ﬁrst oﬀer ever received
and all matches between the seller and a potential buyer result in a sale (e.g., Arnold
1999, Chen and Rosenthal 1996a and 1996b, Yava¸ s 1992 and Yava¸ s and Yang 1995).
The results of our empirical analysis clearly point out the limitations of complete
information bargaining models to study housing transactions, and suggest appealing to
an alternative class of bargaining models that can account for salient features of the
data. In a bargaining environment where the seller and the potential buyer of a property
25possess some private information about how much they value the property, the occurrence
of delays in reaching agreement and the possibility of a negotiation terminating with a
separation rather than an agreement are common features of an equilibrium.37
Consider, for example, a bilateral bargaining environment where the potential buyer
makes all the oﬀers (which is the case in our data) and after any rejection there is a
positive probability of an exogenous negotiation breakdown (e.g., because the potential
buyer ﬁnds another property). In this environment, it may be optimal for the buyer to
make a relatively low initial “screening” oﬀer that is accepted only if the seller’s valuation
is relatively low. If the oﬀer is rejected, the buyer updates his beliefs about the seller’s
valuation and may either walk away or increase his oﬀer, unless of course the negotiation
breaks down for exogenous reasons. Note that although a rejection may be followed by a
higher oﬀer, it may still be optimal for a seller with a relatively low valuation to accept
the buyer’s initial oﬀer because of the risk of negotiation breakdown.38
Combining this bargaining framework with the long-term optimization problem faced
by the seller described in Section 4.1, we can now analyze the behavior of sellers across
negotiations over time. When some sellers face a time constraint for the sale of their
property, their continuation value declines over time. As a result, the minimum oﬀer
they are willing to accept also declines over time. Hence, it may be optimal for a seller to
reject an oﬀer from a potential buyer early on and then accept a lower oﬀer from another
potential buyer at a later time.
In addition to providing an explanation for the empirical ﬁndings mentioned above,
our theoretical analysis generates the following testable predictions. First, holding ev-
erything else constant, the probability of success of a negotiation should increase with
the level of the oﬀers and time on the market, and decrease with the number of previous
unsuccessful negotiations. Second, the sale price should decrease with time on the mar-
ket, and increase with with the number of negotiations. Ceteris paribus, our bargaining
model implies that, within each negotiation, the higher an oﬀer the more likely it is that
the seller will accept it. As time goes by, our assumption that some sellers face a time
constraint implies that the probability a seller will accept any given oﬀer is increasing
and hence the sale price is decreasing. Finally, consider two sellers who list identical
properties in the same market at the same time. Given the same time on the market,
37See, e.g., the survey by Kennan and Wilson (1993) and the references therein.
38The strategies described here correspond to the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a ﬁnite-
horizon sequential bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information where the uninformed player
makes all the oﬀers (e.g., Sobel and Takahashi 1983). This equilibrium would also exist in an environment
with two-sided incomplete information, where other equilibria would also arise (e.g., Cho 1990 and
Cramton 1992).
26our framework implies that the seller who previously experienced the most unsuccessful
negotiations is more likely to have a higher valuation of her property than the other
seller. Hence, her current negotiation is more likely to be unsuccessful. However, if it is
successful, the sale price is more likely to be higher. Note that alternative theories that
abstract from matching and bargaining would likely be silent with respect to these im-
plications of our framework. Moreover, complete information bargaining models would
predict no relation between the number of matches and either the probability of success
of a negotiation or the sale price.
Table 20: Probability of success of a negotiation




















To test the ﬁrst set of implications of our analysis we deﬁne the variable SUCCESS as
a binary variable that equals one if bargaining within a match leads to a sale agreement
and zero if it terminates with a separation. The results of a logit estimation where SUC-
CESS is the dependent variable and the set of independent variables includes property
characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between
initial listing and the occurrence of the match, the maximum oﬀer in the match as a
percentage of the eﬀective listing price at the time of the match (MAXOELP), and the
27number of previous unsuccessful matches (NPMATCH), are reported in Table 20.39 The
results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical framework.
To test the second set of implications of our analysis we regress the sale price (SALEP)
on the property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the initial list-
ing price, the number of weeks from initial listing to sale agreement, and the number of
matches since initial listing (NMATCH). The results are contained in Table 21. Again,
the results match the predictions of our theoretical framework. Ceteris paribus, the
longer the time on the market, the lower the sale price. This is a well known empirical
ﬁnding which is also consistent with other existing theories of housing transactions (e.g.,
Miller 1978, and Yava¸ s and Yang 1995). The ﬁnding that the sale price increases with
the number of matches, however, is new and points to the role of incomplete information
in the transaction process.
Table 21: Sale price





















Overall, these results highlight the importance of accounting for incomplete infor-
mation in the strategic interactions between buyers and sellers in order to explain the
39We report robust standard errors which account for the fact that observations are independent across
properties but not across negotiations within the same transaction history.
28sequence of events that lead to housing transactions. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that these
events are signiﬁcant determinants of the sale price.
References
Anglin, Paul M., Ronald Rutherford, and Thomas A. Springer (2001): “The Trade-oﬀ
between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and the Time-on-the-Market,”
University of Windsor, mimeo.
Arnold, Michael A. (1999): “Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices,” Real Estate
Economics, 27:453-482.
Chen, Yongmin, and Robert W. Rosenthal (1996a): “Asking Prices as Commitment
Devices,” International Economic Review, 36:129-155.
Chen, Yongmin, and Robert W. Rosenthal (1996b): “On the Use of Ceiling-Price Com-
mitments by Monopolists,” Rand Journal of Economics, 27:207-220.
Cheshire, Paul and Stephen Sheppard (2000): “Hedonic Perspectives on the Price of
Land: Space, access, and amenity,” London School of Economics, mimeo.
Cho, In-Koo (1990): “Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 57:575-595.
Coles, Melvyn G. (1998): “Stock-Flow Matching,” University of Essex, mimeo.
Cramton, Peter C. (1984): “Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Inﬁnite–
Horizon Model with Two–Sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies, 51:579-
593.
Flinn, C. and J. Heckman (1982):“New Methods for Analyzing Structural Models of
Labor Force Dynamics,” Journal of Econometrics 18:115-168.
Genesove, David, and Christopher J. Mayer (1997): “Equity and Time to Sale in the
Real Estate Market,” American Economic Review, 87:255-269.
Genesove, David, and Christopher J. Mayer (2001): “Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior:
Evidence from the Housing Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116:1233-
1260.
Glower, Michel, Donald R. Haurin, and Patric H. Hendershott (1998): “Selling Time
and Selling Price: The Inﬂuence of Seller Motivation,” Real Estate Economics,
26:719-740.
29Haurin, Donald (1988): “The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing,”
Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 16:396-
410.
Horowitz, Joel L. (1992): “The Role of the List Price in Housing Markets: Theory and
Econometric Model,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 7:115-129.
Kennan, John, and Robert Wilson (1993): “Bargaining with Private Information,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 31:45-104.
Knight, John R., C. F. Sirmans, and Geoﬀrey K. Turnbull (1998): “List Price Information
in Residential Appraisal and Underwriting,” Journal of Real Estate Research, 15:59-
76.
Knight, John R. (2002): “Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price:
Causes and Eﬀects of Listing Price Changes,” Real Estate Economics, 30:213-237.
Levitt, Steven D., and Chad Syverson (2002): “Market Distortions when Agents are Bet-
ter Informed: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration of the Value of Information
in Real Estate Transactions,” University of Chicago, mimeo.
Nash, John F. (1950): “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, 18:155-162.
Rubinstein, Ariel (1982): “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica,
50:97-109.
Sobel, Joel, and Ichiro Takahashi (1983): “A Multistage Model of Bargaining,” Review
of Economic Studies, 50:411-426.
Springer, Thomas M. (1996): “Single Family Housing Transactions: Seller Motivations,
Price and Marketing Time,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 13:237-
254.
Yava¸ s, Abdullah (1992): “A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Mar-
kets,” Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association,
20:533-548.
Yava¸ s, Abdullah, and Shiawee Yang (1995): “The Strategic Role of Listing Price in
Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence,” Real Estate Economics, 23:347-
368.
Zuehlke, Thomas W. (1987): “Duration Dependence in the Housing Market,” The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 701-704.
30CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
708  Frode Meland and Gaute Torsvik, Structural Adjustment and Endogenous Worker
Recall Probabilities, April 2002
709  Rainer Niemann and Caren Sureth, Taxation under Uncertainty – Problems of Dynamic
Programming and Contingent Claims Analysis in Real Option Theory, April 2002
710  Thomas Moutos and William Scarth, Technical Change and Unemployment: Policy
Responses and Distributional Considerations, April 2002
711  Günther Rehme, (Re-)Distribution of Personal Incomes, Education and Economic
Performance Across Countries, April 2002
712  Thorvaldur Gylfason and Gylfi Zoega, Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural
Resources Matter?, April 2002
713  Wolfgang Leininger, Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-
Rider Problem, April 2002
714  Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, April 2002
715  Giorgio Brunello, Maria Laura Parisi, and Daniela Sonedda, Labor Taxes and Wages:
Evidence from Italy, May 2002
716  Marta Aloi and Huw Dixon, Entry Dynamics, Capacity Utilisation and Productivity in a
Dynamic Open Economy, May 2002
717  Paolo M. Panteghini, Asymmetric Taxation under Incremental and Sequential
Investment, May 2002
718  Ben J. Heijdra, Christian Keuschnigg, and Wilhelm Kohler, Eastern Enlargement of the
EU: Jobs, Investment and Welfare in Present Member Countries, May 2002
719  Tapio Palokangas, The Political Economy of Collective Bargaining, May 2002
720  Gilles Saint-Paul, Some Evolutionary Foundations for Price Level Rigidity, May 2002
721  Giorgio Brunello and Daniela Sonedda, Labor Tax Progressivity, Wage Determination,
and the Relative Wage Effect, May 2002
722  Eric van Damme, The Dutch UMTS-Auction, May 2002
723  Paolo M. Panteghini, Endogenous Timing and the Taxation of Discrete Investment
Choices, May 2002
724  Achim Wambach, Collusion in Beauty Contests, May 2002725  Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet, Preponderance of Evidence, May 2002
726  Gilles Saint-Paul, Growth Effects of  Non Proprietary Innovation, May 2002
727  Subir Bose, Gerhard O. Orosel, and Lise Vesterlund, Optimal Pricing and Endogenous
Herding, May 2002
728  Erik Leertouwer and Jakob de Haan, How to Use Indicators for ‘Corporatism’ in
Empirical Applications, May 2002
729  Matthias Wrede, Small States, Large Unitary States and Federations, May 2002
730  Christian Schultz, Transparency and Tacit Collusion in a Differentiated Market, May
2002
731  Volker Grossmann, Income Inequality, Voting Over the Size of Public Consumption,
and Growth, May 2002
732  Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Working Time and Employment under Uncertainty,
May 2002
733  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume, and Lars Sørgard, Downstream Merger with
Oligopolistic Input Suppliers, May 2002
734  Saku Aura, Does the Balance of Power Within a Family Matter? The Case of the
Retirement Equity Act, May 2002
735  Sandro Brusco and Fausto Panunzi, Reallocation of Corporate Resources and
Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets, May 2002
736  Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, Strategic Power Revisited, May 2002
737  Martin W. Cripps, Godfrey Keller, and Sven Rady, Strategic Experimentation: The
Case of Poisson Bandits, May 2002
738  Pierre André Chiappori and Bernard Salanié, Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of
Some Recent Work, June 2002
739  Robert J. Gary-Bobo and Sophie Larribeau, A Structural Econometric Model of Price
Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Industry, June 2002
740  Laurent Linnemer, When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare,
June 2002
741  Gebhard Kirchgässner and Friedrich Schneider, On the Political Economy of
Environmental Policy, June 2002
742  Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Start-ups, Venture Capitalits, and the
Capital Gains Tax, June 2002743  Robert Fenge, Silke Uebelmesser, and Martin Werding, Second-best Properties of
Implicit Social Security Taxes: Theory and Evidence, June 2002
744  Wendell Fleming and Jerome Stein, Stochastic Optimal Control, International Finance
and Debt, June 2002
745  Gene M. Grossman, The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of
International Trade, June 2002
746  Oleksiy Ivaschenko, Growth and Inequality: Evidence from Transitional Economies,
June 2002
747  Burkhard Heer, Should Unemployment Benefits be Related to Previous Earnings?, July
2002
748  Bas van Aarle, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Jacob Engwerda, and Joseph Plasmans,
Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation
in the European Economic and Monetary Union, July 2002
749  Hans Gersbach, Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda
Costs, July 2002
750  Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?, July 2002
751  Jonas Agell and Helge Bennmarker, Wage Policy and Endogenous Wage Rigidity: A
Representative View From the Inside, July 2002
752  Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies, July 2002
753  Rebecca M. Blank, U.S. Welfare Reform: What’s Relevant for Europe?, July 2002
754  Ruslan Lukach and Joseph Plasmans, Measuring Knowledge Spillovers Using Patent
Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm’s Data, July 2002
755  Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Boom-Bust Cycles in Middle Income Countries:
Facts and Explanation, July 2002
756  Jan K. Brueckner, Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis, July
2002
757  Lawrence M. Kahn, The Impact of Wage-Setting Institutions on the Incidence of Public
Employment in the OECD: 1960-98, July 2002
758  Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Policy in the European Union, August 2002
759  Chandima Mendis, External Shocks and Banking Crises in Developing Countries: Does
the Exchange Rate Regime Matter?, August 2002
760  Bruno S. Frey and Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical
Analysis, August 2002
761  Lars Calmfors and Åsa Johansson, Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and
Monetary Union, August 2002762  Alexander R. W. Robson and Stergios Skaperdas, Costly Enforcement of Property
Rights and the Coase Theorem, August 2002
763  Horst Raff, Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct
Investment, August 2002
764  Alex Cukierman and V. Anton Muscatelli, Do Central Banks have Precautionary
Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability? – Theory and Evidence, August 2002
765  Giovanni Peri, Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Externalities, August 2002
766  Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh, Equilibrium Vengeance, August 2002
767  Sam Bucovetsky and Michael Smart, The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue
Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions, August 2002
768  Tapio Palokangas, International Labour Market Regulation and Economic Growth with
Creative Destruction, August 2002
769  Rudi Dornbusch, The New International Architecture, September 2002
770  Hans-Werner Sinn, Weber’s Law and the Biological Evolution of Risk Preferences: The
Selective Dominance of the Logarithmic Utility Function, September 2002
771  Thomas Mayer, The Macroeconomic Loss Function: A Critical Note, September 2002
772  Seppo Honkapohja and Kaushik Mitra, Learning Stability in Economies with
Heterogenous Agents, September 2002
773  David Laidler, Inflation Targets Versus International Monetary Integration – A
Canadian Perspective, September 2002
774  Morten I. Lau, Panu Poutvaara, and Andreas Wagener, The Dynamic Cost of the Draft,
September 2002
775  Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Charles van Marrewijk, Locational Competition
and Agglomeration: The Role of Government Spending, September 2002
776  Anke S. Kessler and Christoph Lülfesmann, The Theory of Human Capital Revisited:
On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments, September 2002
777  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Lars Sørgard, Unionized Oligopoly, Trade
Liberalization and Location Choice, September 2002
778  Antonio Merlo and François Ortalo-Magné, Bargaining over Residential Real Estate:
Evidence from England, September 2002